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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SHADUR, Senior District Judge: 
 
This is an appeal by Branchburg Plaza Associates, L.P. 
("Branchburg"), a creditor of bankrupt debtor William Fesq 
("Fesq"). Branchburg claims that both the bankruptcy court 
and then the district court erred in denying Branchburg's 
motion to vacate the bankruptcy court's earlier order 
confirming Fesq's Chapter 13 plan. We have jurisdiction 
over the appeal under 28 U.S.C. S158(d), and we affirm the 
district court's decision. 
 
Background 
 
This long-running dispute between Branchburg and Fesq 
goes back to April 16, 1993, when Branchburg recovered a 
$69,166.59 judgment against Fesq in New Jersey Superior 
Court. On December 17, 1993 Branchburg obtained a writ 
of execution against Fesq's house to enforce that judgment. 
 
Fesq then avoided a foreclosure sale of the house byfiling 
a Chapter 7 petition on July 14, 1995. That respite proved 
short-lived, however, for Branchburg's lien on the real 
property survived the Chapter 7 proceeding. Branchburg 
again sought to foreclose on its lien shortly after the 
Chapter 7 proceeding closed. 
 
Branchburg's persistence led Fesq to file a Chapter 13 
proceeding on March 6, 19961 that addressed only 
Branchburg's lien on the house. Fesq's proposed plan 
provided for a single lump-sum payment of $7,050 in full 
satisfaction of Branchburg's secured claim. Branchburg's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. All of the remaining dates referred to here were also during 1996, so 
we omit the year designations from here on out. 
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attorney Friedman Siegelbaum ("Siegelbaum")filed a notice 
of appearance in the Chapter 13 case, but he then failed to 
attend the Section 341(a) first meeting of creditors or to 
schedule a Rule 2004 examination of Fesq.2  More 
importantly, Siegelbaum did not file any objections to 
Fesq's proposed plan by the August 5 deadline date for 
such objections. There were consequently no objections to 
Fesq's proposal, and an order of confirmation was entered 
on August 15. 
 
Fesq filed a motion to vacate Branchburg's lien 
immediately upon entry of the confirmation order. On 
August 30 Branchburg filed a cross-motion to vacate the 
confirmation order, asserting that its failure to make a 
timely objection was the result of a computer glitch at 
Siegelbaum's firm, which had led him to believe that the 
deadline for the filing of objections to the proposed plan 
would not arrive until October 5, rather than the actual 
August 5 date.3 Branchburg argued that it would have 
objected to several substantive aspects of Fesq's plan but 
for the computer error. 
 
On October 28 the bankruptcy court's oral ruling granted 
Fesq's motion and denied Branchburg's cross-motion. That 
ruling was affirmed on appeal by the district court in an 
unpublished memorandum opinion. Branchburg then 
brought a timely appeal to this Court. 
 
Standard of Review 
 
This appeal raises only a question of law, not one of fact. 
We therefore exercise plenary review over the decision of 
the district court (In re Fegeley, 118 F.3d 979, 982 (3d Cir. 
1997)). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. All "Section --" references in this opinion are to the Title 11 
provisions 
of the Bankruptcy Code ("Code"). Both the Bankruptcy Rules and the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are cited "Rule --," a usage that should 
not generate any confusion because the former set uses four-digit 
numbers, while the latter employs two-digit numbers. 
 
3. Branchburg claims that it could not appeal the confirmation order 
because the 10-day period for filing an appeal had passed before it 
realized that the confirmation order had been entered. 
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Revocation of the Confirmation Order 
 
Branchburg's appeal poses the fundamental question 
whether a final order confirming a debtor's Chapter 13 plan 
can be vacated without a showing of fraud, an issue that 
the parties have contested in terms of what grounds are 
available under law for revocation of such confirmation 
orders. While fraud is the only predicate that is specifically 
mentioned in the Code for the revocation of a confirmation 
order, Branchburg insists that courts may also revoke such 
orders that have been the consequence of mistake, 
inadvertence or excusable neglect. This appeal hinges on 
that point, because Branchburg admits that its failure to 
object to the confirmation order was the result of a 
combination of human and computer error, not fraud. So if 
Branchburg is wrong and if fraud is indeed the only basis 
upon which we may revoke a Chapter 13 confirmation 
order, we must affirm the district court irrespective of the 
potential merit of Branchburg's substantive allegations. 
 
Our analysis must begin with the language of Section 
1330(a), the Code provision that deals with the revocation 
of a Chapter 13 confirmation order: 
 
       On request of a party in interest at any time within 180 
       days after the date of the entry of an order of 
       confirmation under section 1325 of this title, and after 
       notice and a hearing, the court may revoke such order 
       if such order was procured by fraud. 
 
It is of course conventional wisdom that the statute should 
be read to give some effect to the final phrase"if such order 
was procured by fraud," for as a general rule of statutory 
construction "[w]e strive to avoid a result that would render 
statutory language superfluous, meaningless, or irrelevant" 
(Cushman v. Trans Union Corp., 115 F.3d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 
1997)). And here it is particularly unlikely that the final 
phrase is mere surplusage, because it would have been so 
easy not to include the phrase if it were really superfluous. 
Simply excising the phrase from the statute would have left 
a perfectly sensible sentence that would accomplish every 
purpose of the current statute--except, that is, for limiting 
the grounds for relief, the subject that we address 
hereafter. 
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Ordinary English usage tells us that Section 1330(a) is 
subject to only two interpretations if we are to avoid 
rendering meaningless the qualification "if such order was 
procured by fraud." First, the section can be read to say 
that a confirmation order can be revoked only upon a 
showing of fraud, and to set a 180-day time frame within 
which a motion for such relief may be tendered. Second, 
the section can be read as only prescribing a 180-day time 
limit on motions to revoke orders that were procured by 
fraud, without speaking at all to the subject of other 
potential grounds for revocation. For the reasons discussed 
in this opinion, we conclude that the first construction is 
the more reasonable interpretation of Congress' intent. 
 
Nonetheless Branchburg insists that the second 
interpretation should be favored and that Section 1330(a) 
should be read to permit judicial revocation of confirmation 
orders for reasons other than fraud. Branchburg advances 
that contention by pointing to Rule 9024, which makes 
Rule 60(b) generally applicable to bankruptcy cases. In 
relevant part Rule 60(b), in contrast to Section 1330(a), 
allows for relief from final orders in the generic sense on a 
number of bases: 
 
       [T]he court may relieve a party ...from afinal judgment, 
       order or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) 
       mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; 
       ...(3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic 
       or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of 
       an adverse party; ...or (6) any other reason justifying 
       relief from the operation of the judgment. 
 
Branchburg argues (1) that its counsel's computer 
mishap qualifies as "mistake, inadvertence...or excusable 
neglect" under Rule 60(b) and (2) that because Rule 9024 
makes Rule 60(b) generally applicable in bankruptcy, the 
revocation of Fesq's Chapter 13 confirmation order is called 
for. That position requires an examination of the 
relationship between Section 1330(a) and Rule 9024 to see 
whether Branchburg can properly take advantage of Rule 
60(b)'s more expansive grounds for relief. 
 
Branchburg wisely does not attempt to argue that Rule 
9024 simply trumps Section 1330(a), for when Congress 
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accorded the Supreme Court authority to promulgate the 
Bankruptcy Rules, it stated "[s]uch rules shall not abridge, 
enlarge, or modify any substantive right" (28 U.S.C. S2075). 
Thus, "[a]s a general matter, the Code defines the creation, 
alteration or elimination of substantive rights but the 
Bankruptcy Rules define the process by which these 
privileges may be effected" (In re Hanover Indus. Mach. Co., 
61 B.R. 551, 552 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986)). So Rule 9024 
cannot validly provide Branchburg with a substantive 
remedy that would be foreclosed by Section 1330(a). 
 
Branchburg tries to avoid that problem by interpreting 
Section 1330(a) so that it complements, rather than 
conflicts with, Rule 9024. Branchburg contends that Rule 
9024 (via Rule 60(b)) sets out all of the potential grounds 
for revoking Chapter 13 confirmation orders and that 
Section 1330(a) simply shortens the deadline for 
challenging confirmation orders to 180 days for fraud alone 
(Rule 60(b) allows parties one year to file motions for relief 
based on mistake, inadvertence, excusable neglect or 
fraud). And Branchburg attempts to support that 
interpretation by pointing to the text of Rule 9024:4 
 
       Rule 60 F.R. Civ. P. applies to cases under the code 
       except that...(3) a complaint to revoke an order 
       confirming a plan may be filed only within the time 
       allowed by S 1144, S 1230, or S 1330. 
 
Branchburg obviously prefers to ignore just how strongly 
counterintuitive--indeed, logically absurd--its position 
really is. It posits a scenario in which the drafters of Rule 
9024 came onto a scene already occupied by a 
congressional 180-day limitation on the ability of the 
victims of fraud to be relieved of the consequences of that 
fraud,5 and saying something along these lines: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Sections 1144 and 1230(a) are companion statutes to Section 1330(a), 
with the first of those addressing revocation of Chapter 11 confirmation 
orders and the second dealing with revocation of Chapter 12 
confirmation orders. 
 
5. Not even Branchburg has suggested that the use of "may" in Section 
1330(a) is permissive in the sense that a fraud victim "may" seek relief 
within 180 days, and "may" also seek relief more than 180 days, after 
entry of a confirmation order. Any such reading would plainly render the 
statute totally meaningless--accomplishing nothing at all. 
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       We recognize that Congress has provided a remedy for 
       the victims of fraud. But we also believe that others, 
       though perhaps less deserving (people who wish to be 
       relieved from an order of confirmation that was entered 
       in consequence of their own negligence or mistake), are 
       also entitled to solicitude. So even though Congress 
       has chosen to say nothing about people in that latter 
       category (as it could easily have done by simply 
       omitting the language "if such order was procured by 
       fraud" from its Section 1330(a) statute dealing with 
       judicial relief via revocation), we'll give those people 
       exactly the same opportunity as victims of fraud to ask 
       for such relief. 
 
That reading has nothing to commend it, for it is the 
equivalent of permitting the drafters of Rule 9024(3) to 
deprive the final phrase of Section 1330(a) of any 
substantive effect--something that Congress did not choose 
to do and that neither such drafters nor we judicial readers 
of congressional legislation are authorized to do. By 
contrast, if Section 1330(a) is read as stating that an order 
confirming a plan cannot be revoked except upon a 
showing of fraud, a complaint to revoke a confirmed plan 
may still be filed under Rule 60 (as contemplated in Rule 
9024(3)) because fraud is one of the bases for relief under 
that rule.6 Thus our decision today gives effect to both 
Section 1330(a)(which would of course trump anyway in the 
event of a conflict between that statute and a rule) and 
Rule 9024(3). 
 
Heedless of the illogic of its contention, Branchburg 
would have it that Rule 9024 leaves undisturbed the 
Section 1330(a) time limit for seeking revocation on fraud 
grounds, but that the Rule does not treat the statute as 
having limited the grounds for relief. To that end 
Branchburg stresses Rule 9024's use of "time allowed" as 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. In addition, although Rule 60(b) cannot be used as a vehicle for 
revoking such orders for reasons other than fraud, it may still be used 
to correct some other problems that arise with such orders. So, for 
example, courts could still redress clerical mistakes via Rule 60(b) 
without fear of violating Section 1330(a) (cf. 8 Collier on Bankruptcy 
("Collier") P1144.07[1] (Lawrence W. King ed. in chief, 15th revised ed. 
1997)). 
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somehow demonstrating that Section 1330(a)'s sole 
function is to specify an abbreviated time period for 
challenging confirmation orders because the challenger was 
defrauded. As a necessary corollary to that conclusion, 
Branchburg would have it that the phrase "if such order 
was procured by fraud" in Section 1330(a) is simply 
permissive rather than exclusive in nature.7 In other words, 
according to Branchburg Section 1330(a) does not inhibit a 
court's ability to revoke a confirmation order due to a 
party's mistake or excusable neglect (for example)--rather 
the statute merely reinforces that fraud is one of the 
acceptable reasons to revoke a confirmation order. 
 
Even apart from Branchburg's having glossed over the 
already-discussed unacceptability of its view that 
rulemakers can essentially override or eliminate 
distinctions that Congress has chosen to include in its 
enactments, Branchburg offers no reason why Congress 
would find it necessary to reassure courts that fraud-- 
among all of the grounds for relief enumerated in Rule 60(b) 
--is a permissible reason to revoke a confirmation order. 
Surely if any confirmation of the circumstances entitling a 
litigant to relief were needed, actual fraud on the litigant 
would be the least likely candidate for such a statutory 
confirmation. Thus on its face the Section 1330(a) language 
makes far more sense as a substantive limitation than as a 
needless permissive reminder. It is hardly surprising, then, 
that further scrutiny of Branchburg's reasoning (or lack of 
it) exposes several other fatal flaws. 
 
First, Branchburg's argument relies exclusively on the 
language of Rule 9024 to extract a strained meaning from 
Section 1330(a). But we have already confirmed that 
bankruptcy rules cannot "abridge, enlarge, or modify" the 
substantive rights afforded by the Bankruptcy Code. Hence 
Branchburg's attempt to negate the substantive impact of 
the restriction contained in Section 1330(a) solely on the 
basis of Rule 9024's language also runs afoul of separation 
of power principles. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Here Branchburg must argue the statute's nonexclusivity in the 
subject-matter sense explained next in the text, not in the obviously 
impermissible temporal sense that has been scotched here in n.5. 
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Furthermore, Branchburg's reasoning collapses if applied 
to related parts of the Code. Rule 9024 also adverts in 
identical terms to "the time allowed by S1144" for revoking 
Chapter 11 confirmation orders. If then Branchburg's 
proposed approach were valid, the Section 1144 ground for 
relief should be merely permissive as well. But Section 
1144 could not be more explicit: It states that a court may 
revoke a Chapter 11 confirmation order "if and only if such 
order was procured by fraud." It surely cannot be said that 
the single Section 1144 ground for relief is merely 
permissive, and that correspondingly undercuts any 
legitimacy of Branchburg's parallel argument as to Section 
1330(a). 
 
Because there is a difference in locution between the "if 
and only if" language in Section 1144 and the simple "if" 
usage in Sections 1330(a) and 1230(a), it is worth a few 
moments to explain that no intended difference in meaning 
flows from that distinction. Originally Section 1144 
mirrored the language of Sections 1330(a) and 1230(a) by 
allowing revocation "if such order was procured by fraud," 
but in 1984 Congress amended Section 1144 to say"if and 
only if." That amendment was part of the Bankruptcy 
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 (Pub.L. 
98-353, Title III S515, 98 Stat. 387), which was intended 
primarily to cure the constitutional problems in the 1978 
Bankruptcy Act identified by Northern Pipeline v. Marathon 
Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982). Hence most of the Act was 
devoted to restoring the jurisdiction, procedure and 
judgeships of the bankruptcy court system, but Subtitle H, 
aptly named "Miscellaneous Amendments to Title 11," also 
contained a slew of technical changes to the Code, 
including the amendment to Section 1144 (Pub.L. 98-353, 
Title III S515, 98 Stat. 387). 
 
Nothing in the sparse legislative history suggests, nor is 
there any logical reason to believe, that the 1984 
amendment sought to alter Section 1144 to give it a 
meaning different from the meaning of Sections 1330(a) and 
1230(a). Quite to the contrary, there would be no rational 
purpose for Congress to prescribe a different standard for 
the revocation of Chapter 11 confirmation orders than for 
those under Chapters 12 or 13. Why should the ability or 
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inability of a creditor to revoke a confirmation order due to 
mistake or inadvertence depend on the debtor's status as 
an individual, a farmer or a corporation? 
 
Reading the 1984 amendment as simply clarifying the 
original intent of Congress, on the other hand, preserves 
the uniformity between the three sections. That approach 
has consistently been taken by commentators and courts 
that have had occasion to compare the amended version of 
Section 1144 with Sections 1230(a) and 1330(a). Thus 8 
Collier P1144.02 n.1 refers to the "minor textual difference" 
between the three statutes and says that the difference "is 
not substantive and the standards for revocation should be 
the same under all three chapters." And see In re Hicks, 79 
B.R. 45, 47 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1987) and In re Edwards, 67 
B.R. 1008, 1009 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1986), agreeing that 
Section 1144 and Section 1330 are "essentially identical." 
 
That treatment also comports with the context and 
background of the 1984 Act. Subtitle H's name, 
organization and content provide no support for the idea 
that Congress sought to make any kind of systemic 
overhaul of the relationship between Chapter 11 and 
Chapter 13. On the contrary, Subtitle H's veritable 
kaleidoscope of minor amendments on a wide array of 
subjects creates a strong sense that Congress was merely 
tinkering with the language of the Code to clarify its 
original meaning. 
 
Though the absence of any legislative history precludes a 
definitive determination on that score, a bit of detective 
work has suggested a possible explanation. It seems 
entirely plausible that such a change found its way to 
someone's checklist at the time the miscellaneous package 
of amendments that ended up in the 1984 legislation was 
being put together because a bankruptcy court opinion had 
treated fraud as a nonexclusive basis for revoking Chapter 
11 confirmation orders. Solon Automated Servs., Inc. v. 
Georgetown of Kettering, Ltd., 22 B.R. 312, 317 (Bankr. 
S.D. Ohio 1982), which was issued during the gestation 
period that produced the miscellaneous 1984 amendments 
(a period that began in 1982), had suggested that 
"compelling circumstances," such as when a creditor with 
a sufficiently large claim to affect the outcome of the 
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confirmation process failed to receive notice, could also 
constitute grounds for revoking a Chapter 11 confirmed 
plan. There were no comparable decisions in the Chapter 
12 or Chapter 13 contexts, and it is entirely 
understandable that the sprawling set of 1984 amendments 
did not create a seamless web by including conforming 
changes in Sections 1230(a) and 1330(a). There is no 
warrant for drawing a negative inference from the difference 
in statutory language. 
 
Enough then for logic--we turn to precedent. Not 
surprisingly, Branchburg's argument also runs counter to 
the strong current of the case law. Thus our In re Szostek, 
886 F.2d 1405 (3d Cir. 1989) decision has treated fraud as 
the only predicate that could justify revoking a confirmation 
order under Section 1330. Szostek, id. at 1413 refused to 
revoke a Chapter 13 confirmation order even though a 
creditor alleged that the confirmed plan violated the 
substantive requirements of Section 1325: 
 
       We conclude that once the [debtor's] plan was 
       confirmed, it became final under S 1327 and, absent a 
       showing of fraud under S 1330(a), it could not be 
       challenged under S 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) for failure to pay 
       [the creditor] the present value of its claim. 
 
That same reading has commended itself to the Eleventh 
Circuit as so clearly correct that In re Hochman, 853 F.2d 
1547 (11th Cir. 1988) simply affirmed per curiam the 
reasoning of the district court that had so held, sub nom. 
United States v. Lee, 89 B.R. 250 (N.D. Ga. 1987). And cf. 
In re Pence, 905 F.2d 1107, 1110 (7th Cir. 1990), relying for 
parallel Section 1330(a) purposes on In re Longardner & 
Assocs., Inc., 855 F.2d 455, 461 (7th Cir. 1988) and its 
statement that "section 1144 requires a showing of fraud." 
Even though succinct, Pence's reference to Section 1330(a) 
as "listing fraud as the only basis for revocation of 
confirmation" surely further confirms that as the common- 
sense reading of the statutory language. 
 
Finally, it is not only bankruptcy courts in this Circuit 
(which are of course bound to follow Szostek) that have 
agreed that Section 1330(a) establishes fraud as the only 
permitted ground for obtaining relief from an order of 
 
                                11 
  
confirmation. District and bankruptcy courts from 
numerous other Circuits have also echoed that view 
(examples, listed in order of the Circuits where the lower 
courts are located, are In re Klus, 173 B.R. 51, 57 (Bankr. 
D. Conn. 1994); In re Walker, 114 B.R. 847, 851 (Bankr. 
N.D. N.Y. 1990); In re Woods, 130 B.R. 204, 205 (W.D. Va. 
1990); In re Scott, 77 B.R. 636, 637 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 
1987); In re Young, 132 B.R. 395, 397 (S.D. Ind. 1990); In 
re Trembath, 205 B.R. 909, 915 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1997); In 
re Puckett, 193 B.R. 842, 845-46 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996); In 
re Hood, 211 B.R. 334, 335 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1997); United 
States v. Edmonston, 99 B.R. 995, 997 (E.D. Cal. 1989); In 
re Hoppel, 203 B.R. 730, 732 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1997); In re 
Duke, 153 B.R. 913, 919 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1993)).8 
 
Over and above the plain thrust of the statutory 
language, we conclude that Congress intended that reading 
of Section 1330(a) because it protects the finality of Chapter 
13 confirmation orders. As we have previously recognized, 
Congress established finality as an important goal of 
bankruptcy law. On that score Szostek, id. at 1409 
repeated the language of In re Penn Central Transp. Co., 
771 F.2d 762, 767 (3rd Cir. 1985) that: 
 
       the purpose of bankruptcy law and the provisions of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Branchburg cites two cases as purported support for the notion that 
Rule 60(b) and Rule 9024 empower courts to revoke confirmation orders 
on grounds other than fraud, but neither case does the job for 
Branchburg. While In re Burgess, 138 B.R. 56 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1991) 
did rely on Rule 60(b) to revoke a Chapter 13 confirmation order, it is an 
extraordinarily weak reed on which to lean--the court did not even 
mention Section 1330(a), let alone attempt to explain why its express 
limitation should not apply. Indeed, the substantive ground for 
revocation relied on in Burgess, id. at 59 was directly at odds with our 
decision in Szostek. Branchburg's second proffer, Southmark Properties v. 
Charles House Corp., 742 F.2d 862, 872 n. 15 (5th Cir. 1984), is 
inapposite because the appellants explicitly acknowledged that they were 
not trying to revoke the confirmation order at issue. Thus, while 
Southmark, id. at 872-77 did discuss at some length (and ultimately 
rejected on the merits) a challenge on equitable grounds to the res 
judicata effect of a confirmation order, the court had no occasion to 
address whether those equitable grounds (if they had instead been found 
valid) might have served as a basis to revoke the order. 
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       reorganization could not be realized if the discharge of 
       debtors were not complete and absolute; that if courts 
       should relax provisions of the law and facilitate the 
       assertion of old claims against discharged and 
       reorganized debtors, the policy of the law would be 
       defeated; that creditors would not participate in 
       reorganization if they could not feel that the plan was 
       final, and that it would be unjust and unfair to those 
       who had accepted and acted upon a reorganization 
       plan if the court were thereafter to reopen the plan and 
       change the conditions which constituted the basis of 
       its earlier acceptance. 
 
Those considerations, in concert with the dictates of 
Section 1327,9 have led courts to impose sharp limits on 
efforts to attack Chapter 13 confirmation orders (see our 
ruling in Szostek, id. at 1408-13 that the protection of the 
finality of Chapter 13 confirmation orders was more 
important than the obligation of the bankruptcy court and 
the trustee to ensure that a plan complied with the Code). 
 
Szostek's policy rationale applies with equal force to the 
issue before us. Revoking a confirmation order is a measure 
that upsets the legitimate expectations of both debtors and 
creditors.10 Interpreting Section 1330(a) as a limiting 
provision permits such disruption in only a very narrow 
category of egregious cases. Branchburg's approach, on the 
other hand, would open the courtroom doors to a large 
number of post-confirmation attacks. Those added 
challenges could seriously undermine the integrity of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Section 1327(a) states: 
 
       The provisions of a confirmed plan bind the debtor and each 
       creditor, whether or not the claim of such creditor is provided for 
by 
       the plan, and whether or not such creditor has objected to, has 
       accepted or has rejected the plan. 
 
10. Congress' reluctance to undermine the finality of Chapter 13 
confirmation orders is further evidenced by the fact that Section 1330(a) 
permits, but does not require, courts to revoke confirmation orders 
procured by fraud. Thus, for example, a court might uphold such an 
order if the debtor had not been responsible for the fraud and if it would 
be either unnecessary or inequitable to dismiss or convert the case (see 
8 Collier P1330.01). 
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Chapter 13 proceedings, as dissatisfied creditors could seek 
to drag out the litigation by bringing themselves under Rule 
60(b)'s broader rubric in an attempt to extract concessions. 
 
In sum, Branchburg's argument that Section 1330(a)'s 
terms are merely permissive is both logically and 
structurally flawed and unsupported by either case law or 
public policy. Branchburg has provided no persuasive 
reason for ignoring the plain meaning of the text of Section 
1330(a). 
 
We adhere to all the relevant considerations--plain 
meaning, logic, case law and the policies underlying the 
Code--to hold that fraud is the only ground for relief 
available for revocation of a Chapter 13 confirmation order. 
And as Branchburg admittedly does not assert that Fesq's 
confirmation order was procured by fraud (only a blunder 
in the office of Branchburg's lawyer is offered as an excuse), 
we will look no further into its allegations and will hence 
affirm the judgment below. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Branchburg's motion to revoke fails to allege a ground for 
relief recognized by Section 1330(a). We must therefore 
uphold the district court's judgment affirming the 
bankruptcy court's denial of Branchburg's motion. We too 
AFFIRM. 
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STAPLETON, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
The parties, the court, and the public have a compelling 
interest in the finality of a judgment. See, e.g., Oneida 
Motor Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 848 F.2d 414, 
417 (3d Cir. 1988); Fox v. United States Dep't of Hous. & 
Human Dev., 680 F.2d 315, 322 (3d Cir. 1982). For that 
reason, a judgment should never be overturned without a 
showing of a more compelling countervailing interest. 
Nevertheless, mistakes are made, and justice miscarries. 
Accordingly, every jurisdiction of which I am aware makes 
some provision for relief from a judgment. In the federal 
system generally, the rule is found in Fed. R. Civ. P. 60. In 
bankruptcy, the rule is found in Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9024, 
which expressly applies to "an order confirming a plan" as 
well as to other forms of judgment entered by a bankruptcy 
court. 
 
Rule 60(b) provides that "the court may relieve a party 
. . . from a final judgment [because of, inter alia,] mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect" so long as 
application is made in accordance with a stipulated time 
schedule. Rule 9024 provides: 
 
        Rule 60 F.R.Civ.P. applies in cases under the Code 
       except that (1) a motion to reopen a case under the 
       Code or for the reconsideration of an order allowing or 
       disallowing a claim against the estate entered without 
       a contest is not subject to the one year limitation 
       prescribed in Rule 60(b), (2) a complaint to revoke a 
       discharge in a chapter 7 liquidation case may befiled 
       only within the time allowed by S 727(e) of the Code, 
       and (3) a complaint to revoke an order confirming a 
       plan may be filed only within the time allowed by 
       S 1144, S 1230, or S 1330. 
 
Rule 9024 thus incorporates the grounds of relief provided 
in Rule 60 and then provides a different time schedule with 
respect to three separate categories of orders. The time limit 
for application for relief from an order confirming a plan of 
reorganization is the 180 days specified in the three cited 
statutory sections. 
 
The court today finds that Congress intended to single 
out one particular type of judgment--a confirmation order-- 
 
                                15 
  
for special treatment and to sharply limit the availability of 
relief from such a judgment to a single ground--fraud. It 
finds this intent in a single statutory provision that appears 
to me to reflect nothing more than an intent to provide a 
limitations period for applications for relief from a 
confirmation order on grounds of fraud. Section 1330(a) of 
the Code says no more than that "the court may revoke [a 
confirmation] order . . . procured by fraud" if "request[ed 
by] a party in interest at any time within 180 days after the 
date of the entry of [the] order." As I read it, and as the 
drafters of Rule 9024 must have read it, section 1330(a) 
says nothing about limiting the grounds on which relief 
from a confirmation order may be granted. The same may 
be said for the legislative history of that section.11 
 
Rule 9024 supplements the non-restrictive provisions of 
section 1330(a), but as a concession to the strong policy of 
finality, it preserves the time limits imposed by that section. 
It is not so logically absurd to conclude that the drafters of 
Rule 9024 thought it prudent to recognize the bankruptcy 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. If any confirmation were needed of the Congressional intent 
evidenced by a literal reading of section 1330(a), I believe it came with 
the passage of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act 
of 1984. Prior to that Act, each of the sections of the Code dealing with 
revocation of orders confirming reorganization plans originally contained 
the clause "if such order was procured by fraud." In the Act, however, 
Congress singled out one of those sections -- section 1144 -- for 
amendment and explicitly limited the court's power to revoke 
confirmation orders in Chapter 11 proceedings"if and only if such order 
was procured by fraud." (emphasis added). The fact that Congress chose 
not to insert a conforming amendment in sections 1330(a) and 1230(a) 
strongly suggests that the Congressional intent to restrict the grounds 
for revoking confirmation orders was confined to section 1144. This 
makes untenable in my view the negative inferences drawn by the court 
from the text of section 1330(a). If, as the court suggests, Congress 
amended section 1144 solely to clarify the original intent of the language 
previously found in all three sections, I would have expected it to have 
clarified all three. Rather than assume an inadvertent slip on its part, I 
deem it more prudent to take Congress at its word. There are any 
number of reasons why Congress may have regarded it advisable to 
provide somewhat greater finality for confirmation orders in corporate 
reorganizations than for confirmation orders in other types of 
reorganizations. 
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court's power to consider other compelling bases for 
revoking a plan confirmation order, and the Rule clearly 
limits the time for filing such challenges to the same period 
as that originally imposed by Congress in section 1330(a). 
 
The court logically observes that any court would know 
that it had the power to revoke a confirmation order 
procured by fraud without statutory confirmation, and that 
section 1330(a) must therefore be read as a substantive 
limitation on the available grounds for relief. But the 
function of section 1330 is not to reassure courts that they 
have the power to revoke confirmation plans for fraud. 
Rather, its function is to provide a check by Congress on a 
court's natural inclination to entertain charges of actual 
fraud at any time--such challenges may only be brought 
within 180 days. This time limitation is the essence of 
section 1330(a), and Rule 9024 incorporates this essential 
element. Section 1330(a) contains no restriction on the 
court's ability to consider any number of bases for revisiting 
a confirmed plan, and Rule 9024 incorporates the only true 
restriction in that section. Rule 9024 in no way runs afoul 
of section 1330(a). 
 
Nor is Branchburg's argument inconsistent with existing 
precedent. While our opinion in In re Szostek, 886 F.2d 
1405 (3d Cir. 1989), contains some broad statements about 
the concerns of finality in confirmed bankruptcy plans, 
those statements must be understood in the context of the 
case to which that opinion is addressed. In July 1987, Fred 
and Denise Szostek filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition. 
One of the Szosteks' creditors, the Kissell Company 
("Kissell"), filed a proof of its secured claim, and the 
Szosteks objected to the amount of the claim. A hearing on 
the objection was scheduled for the same day as the 
hearing on confirmation of the Szosteks' Chapter 13 plan, 
but Kissell and the Szosteks agreed to a continuance of the 
hearing on the objection. Consequently, mistakenly 
thinking that the Szosteks had also agreed to postpone the 
confirmation hearing as well, Kissell failed to appear at the 
confirmation hearing, and the plan was confirmed without 
objection. 
 
Three days later, Kissell filed an objection to the plan on 
the basis that it did not provide for present value on 
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Kissell's secured claim.12 Kissell eventually learned that the 
plan had been confirmed in its absence and without 
considering its objection. It therefore sought revocation of 
confirmation under 11 U.S.C. S 1330. Kissell contended 
that the Szosteks had obtained confirmation of their plan 
through fraud, and that the plan should never have been 
confirmed because it failed to conform to the Code's 
requirement of present value payment on Kissell's' secured 
claim. 
 
The bankruptcy court found no evidence of fraud, so it 
denied revocation of the plan under 11 U.S.C. S 1330. The 
district court reversed. Although it found no fraud, it ruled 
that the bankruptcy court and the trustee had failed to 
fulfill their independent obligations to ensure that the plan 
complied with 11 U.S.C. S 1325(a)(5), which requires 
payment of present value on secured claims. 
 
We reinstated the bankruptcy court's order because 1) 
the bankruptcy court's failure to apply section 1325(a)(5) to 
the plan was not grounds for revoking a confirmed plan in 
the absence of timely objection by the creditor, and 2) after 
confirmation of a plan, the policy of finality of bankruptcy 
plans overrides the court's and the trustee's responsibility 
to ensure that plans conform to section 1325(a)(5) of the 
Bankruptcy Code. 
 
Our ultimate--and quite narrow--conclusion in Szostek 
was simply that "once the Szosteks' plan was confirmed, it 
became final under S 1327 and, absent a showing of fraud 
under S 1330(a), it could not be challenged under 
S 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) for failure to pay Kissell the present value 
of its claim." 886 F.2d at 1413. Our holding in Szostek in 
no way restricted the grounds for revoking confirmation of 
a plan to fraud. We simply rejected the argument advanced 
by Kissell--that failure to comply with section 
1325(a)(5)(b)(ii) could serve as one of those grounds. Kissell 
never attempted to rely on Rules 9024 and 60(b) to revoke 
confirmation of the plan on the basis of mistake or 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Present value is the amount of the secured claim repaid with interest 
to account for the time value of money. The Szosteks' plan provided only 
for payment of the face value of Kissell's claim. 
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excusable neglect, and we were consequently not called 
upon to evaluate such an argument in Szostek. 
 
The reasoning underlying Szostek is not applicable in this 
case. The creditor in Szostek sought to excuse its failure to 
object by relying on a legal argument that it neglected to 
make at the confirmation hearing. In such a situation, the 
policy of finality and constructive assent should apply to 
foreclose the creditor from returning to present an 
argument that should have been presented at another time. 
Branchburg's argument, however, is not that the plan 
should be revoked because Branchburg has a meritorious 
challenge, but because it was prevented from presenting 
that challenge before for a reason that is recognized in the 
procedural rules as a valid basis for revocation. 
Branchburg's absence should not be viewed as constructive 
assent because it might be excused and remedied pursuant 
to statutory authority. Szostek does not control our 
decision in this case.13 
 
The majority also points to a number of bankruptcy and 
district court decisions in support of its reading of section 
1330(a). I find more persuasive the approach taken by the 
Ninth Circuit in an opinion addressing a section analogous 
to section 1330(a) that strongly suggests its disagreement 
with the premise of these other courts. In In re Cisneros, 
994 F.2d 1462 (9th Cir. 1993), the trustee never received 
notice that the IRS had filed a proof of claim, so the 
debtor's Chapter 13 plan was confirmed and a full 
discharge entered after payment in full to all creditors but 
the IRS. After it discovered the mistake, the IRS moved to 
reopen the case. The bankruptcy court sua sponte raised 
the issue of whether it could vacate the discharge on the 
basis of Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), and it concluded that it could 
in fact grant the government's motion on that basis. 
 
On appeal, the debtor argued that the court lacked the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. The same can be said for the limited statements on the scope of 
section 1330(a) in United States v. Lee, 89 B.R. 250, 256 (N.D. Ga. 
1987); and In re Pence, 905 F.2d 1107, 1110 (7th Cir. 1990). Neither of 
these cases considered the issue presented in this case, and the 
reasoning of these cases does not constrain our analysis here. 
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power to vacate the discharge order in light of section 
1328(e), which provides as follows: 
 
       On request of a party in interest before one year after 
       discharge under this section is granted, and after 
       notice and a hearing, the court may revoke such 
       discharge only if-- 
 
       (1) such discharge was obtained by the debtor through 
       fraud; and 
 
       (2) the requesting party did not know of such fraud 
       until after such discharge was granted.14  
 
The debtors argued that, to the extent that section 9024 
provided any grounds other than fraud for revoking a 
discharge, it conflicted with section 1328(e) and was thus 
invalid. 
 
Although the Ninth Circuit agreed that the statute would 
have to take precedence in the event of a conflict, it found 
that no conflict existed and that the bankruptcy court 
could properly revoke the discharge pursuant to Rule 60(b), 
as incorporated by Rule 9024.15 Id. at 1466. While Cisneros 
is also not directly applicable here, it concluded that Rules 
60(b) and 9024 apply under a clearly analogous set of 
circumstances. 
 
Based on the text and legislative history, I am convinced 
that Congress did not intend to give confirmation orders 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. This statute is thus apparently even more restrictive that section 
1330(a); therefore, the Ninth Circuit's reasoning applies a fortiori to 
this 
case. 
 
15. The court also revealed that the bankruptcy court in this case 
wrongly relied on the holding of In re Gregory, 705 F.2d 1118 (9th Cir. 
1983), in support of its conclusion that confirmed plans may only be 
revoked for fraud. The Cisneros court pointed out that it held in Gregory 
only that a creditor who had not objected at the confirmation hearing 
could not mount "a collateral attack" on a plan after it became final. 994 
F.2d at 1466-67. But it emphasized that "[w]e had no occasion to 
consider whether the bankruptcy court had confirmed the plan under 
the influence of a mistaken view of the facts, and, if so, whether this 
mistake could have been corrected under Rule 60(b) and Bankruptcy 
Rule 9024. Gregory is inapposite, and thus unhelpful to the Debtors 
here." Id. at 1467. 
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special treatment by making them impervious to challenge 
save on grounds of fraud. Even if I perceived some 
ambiguity and were less than convinced about this 
proposition, however, I would decline to reach the 
conclusion reached by the court today. Why should we, in 
the absence of an unambiguous directive of Congress, tie 
the hands of bankruptcy judges in situations where justice 
cries out for review of a previously entered judgment. Why, 
for example, should we render a bankruptcy court 
powerless to grant relief when an objecting creditor's 
attorney has a heart attack on his way to a confirmation 
hearing at which a final order is entered? Moreover, not 
only would such a holding fail to serve justice, little, if 
anything, would be gained from it in the way offinality. 
Under the court's reading of the Code and the Rules, 
litigants cannot count on the finality of a confirmation 
order until 180 days after the order is entered. Up until 
that time, a claim of fraud can be asserted and litigated. 
While my reading of the Code and Rules would permit 
claims of a limited variety, other than fraud, to befiled 
during that period, it would not extend the date upon 
which a confirmation order becomes unchallengeable. 
 
I respectfully dissent. I would reverse and remand to 
allow the bankruptcy court to consider Branchburg's 
request to reopen the plan. I would intimate no opinion on 
the merits of Branchburg's claim because I believe the 
bankruptcy court is best situated to make that decision. 
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